The Tribune
UK upholds India's stand
MR Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State, is reported to have been assured by General Musharraf that he will stop cross-LoC movement of terrorists and the same has been conveyed to the Indian leadership. Some discussions are being held by the media as regards joint patrolling and modalities of monitoring the movement. Let it be said at the very outset that the idea of joint patrolling is a political ploy for India to come up with some positive idea to mitigate the feeling created that India has a negative attitude. Practically speaking, it is just "kite flying”. It is unimaginable for Pakistan to agree to joint patrolling in J&K when the two sides have been shooting at each other for 50 years and the Pakistan side is an active abetter in facilitating the infiltration.
There are three areas where steps need to be taken to "turn off the tap” of terrorism in any meaningful manner and progress monitored/checked. Mere monitoring of the cross-LoC movement will not suffice. There are three areas/places to be dealt with. (a) The source — the terrorist camp — headquarters and holding areas in Pakistan/PoK. (b) Holding areas close to the LoC and movement across it. (c) Inside J&K.
To "turn off the tap” of cross-border terrorism in J&K effectively, it is essential to dry the source. Pakistan has to arrest terrorist leaders ensconced safely there, close down their offices and training camps and ensure that the inflow of funds to their organisations is stopped. The international community needs to oversee and effectively monitor these actions on a continued basis. The Al-Qaeda cadres which have moved out of Afghanistan have not just melted away inside Pakistan. They continue to be in groups here and there; in PoK or elsewhere. General Musharraf's effective action to "dry the source” is of critical importance, which will show whether or not he is serious about permanently ending terrorist influx into J&K. Just lessening of the movement across the LoC is a ruse and trick to get the USA off its back and gain some respite from Indian troop deployment.
The LoC is drawn mostly across mountainous terrain varying from low hills to snow-capped mountains, from Akhnoor to Poonch to Uri, Kargil and Siachin. The area is very rugged, interspersed with ravines, cliffs, rivulets and jungles. A great portion is snow-bound too. If it were possible to effectively monitor cross-border movement, the terrorist problem would have been tackled long ago! The fact is that it is not practicable to place soldiers at every yard of the LoC 24 hours a day.
Cross-border movement is being checked by patrolling, laying ambushes, planting mines and through advance intelligence. Hitech surveillance devices like listening/infrared devices and air-surveillance can no doubt augment conventional ground measures and need to be used to the extent available. Coupled with this is the very important role played by the monitoring of radio communications of terrorists, which often gives information of likely infiltration/exfiltration. Notwithstanding this, it needs to be realised that the Americans could not check infiltration in Vietnam in spite of using a number of unique means like defoliaging areas, sensors to detect human sweat levels of infiltrators and the Israelis are unable to seal off their borders. Human intelligence still remains the most effective means to nab large numbers. Our intelligence agencies need to develop sources in villages/habitations on both sides of the LoC to get advance warning of infiltration. Our Army is ready to deal with infiltration once information is available. Movement of troops by foot on mountainous tracks is too slow and time-consuming.
Pakistan had sent in large numbers of infiltrators across the LoC (then called LC) during the 1965 war and they had even set up a "government” in the Rajauri area. This operation failed primarily due to the lack of support from Kashmiris. It was a Bakarwal who gave the first information of their whereabouts in depth areas. The situation today is much different. The terrorists are much better armed, highly trained, motivated and well organised. Even the local terrorists are a force to reckon with. Large caches of arms and equipment have been reported all over and attacks launched in the valley, in the Rajauri area, as far in depth as Doda, and in major cities like Srinagar and Jammu. Even if there is reduction in infiltration, the terrorists already in J&K can pose a considerable danger. It is, therefore, so essential to ensure that the population on our side of the LoC is not alienated, so that the terrorists get little help, sanctuary and information about security forces from the locals.
Terrorism cannot sustain itself without local support, and it is difficult to fight terrorism without cooperation from the locals. Bold and immediate steps need to be taken to reach out to the common man in J&K. To take advantage of the possible lessening of cross-LoC infiltration, the security forces also need to step up their operations against indigenous terrorists.
The statement made by Mr Armitage that General Musharraf has agreed to "turn off the tap” of terrorists permanently has to be taken with quite a pinch of salt. We need to see the progress on the ground over a sustained period. The USA's immediate interest lies in having a couple of Pakistani divisions operating against Al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan to nab the terrorist network's key leaders. Due to pressure on President Bush as a result of the reports that his administration did have reasonable information and still failed to avoid September 11 terrorist acts, the USA would like to successfully wrap up its operations against Al-Qaeda with speed. The Americans would, therefore, like to defuse the situation along the Indo-Pak border so that Pakistan does not have to move any forces from operations against Al-Qaeda. India should go along with this after watching the situation for a while, as it has achieved the immediate aim of General Musharraf agreeing to stop cross-LoC movement and hopefully this would result in reduced violence in the period prior to the elections in J&K. Once the elections are over and if terrorist activities go up, India can again up the ante and take limited action across the LoC. The period October-December is also good for campaigning if the need arises.
Indian forces should be kept along the border for four or five months more. However, as a quid pro quo, India could pull back part of its forces some distance from eyeball-to-eyeball deployment, if General Musharraf shows progress on the ground. However, the troops going back to the barracks, in particular the formations which have permanent locations east of Delhi, has to wait till almost the onset of winter. The Indian leadership has to keep the heat on since General Musharraf has proved to be such a slippery customer. We should not be taken in by a mere statement. Mobilising forces is a time-consuming and costly venture. We must derive long-term benefits from this.
The media also needs to play its part by focusing on such a policy and not indulge in throwing up red herrings based on the statements of General Musharraf while discussing crucial issues dealing with national security.
The writer is a retired Lieut-General.
