The Pioneer
Coercive diplomacy pays off
By Ashok K Mehta
On June 10, nearly six months after India threatened to go to war against Pakistan following the terrorist attack on Parliament, it made the judgement-not without US help-that its coercive diplomacy had paid off and that it could take the first step towards de-escalation. How many times India came to the brink of war may never be known-at least not yet, as the standoff in the game of snakes and ladders is not over. Just how powerful the world's only superpower is can be gauged from the influence it wields, be it with Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka or India.
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage obtained an assurance from General Pervez Musharraf that infiltration had been ended, and permanently. That seemed sufficient for India to move on the ladder of de-escalation even before it had the necessary evidence that cross-border infiltration had been stopped and its infrastructure irreversibly dismantled-conditions it had set for de-escalation. The apparent concessions were made because of the heightened fears of war, even a nuclear exchange, and its adverse impact on business and economy. It is quite another matter that these fears were manipulated to affect business and travel sentiment in order to force de-escalation on India.
It is in this part of the world it used to be said that wars would be short and decisive, no more than 15 days in duration, before outside powers intervened to stop them. It can now be said that the powers that be (which are the powers that were) will not allow a war to start in the first place between two nuclear armed states. Hence, the hype and hysteria surrounding the present standoff. This also brings into question the autonomy India or, for that matter, Pakistan enjoy in threatening to go war, leave alone waging one. It was the international media that put out stories that war was likely to break out by mid-June through an attack by the Indian armed forces. These accounts of war scenarios, including a nuclear exchange, were motivated. Once again it is the US that has played a leading role in ratcheting down tension and extracting the pledge from Pakistan to end infiltration.
It is instructive to compare US intervention now with the role it played during Kargil to help end that war. The July 4, 1999, Blair House agreement signed between Mr Bill Clinton and Mr Nawaz Sharif required Pakistan to withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control (LoC) immediately and unconditionally. People forget that, at the time, the Indian Army had already captured the single most crucial objective of the war, Tiger Hill. It was over the hump. The Blair House agreement merely facilitated a quicker ending and mopping up of hostilities, nothing more. During Kargil India had taken abundant precaution, no doubt at the behest of the West, that the war remained localised and the Indian Army did not cross the LoC.
Curiously, last month, the US media leaked the story by former Director of National Security Council in the Clinton era, Mr Bruce Reidel, that the Pakistan Army was preparing its nuclear arsenal even as Kargil was being fought. Mr Clinton, according to Mr Reidel, is reported to have asked Mr Sharif if he knew what his Army was up to. The purpose of recounting Kargil is to highlight that, while the US played a restraining hand in the standoff, it has also countenanced Pakistan's history of nuclear blackmail- which it has exaggerated-and used the fallout to clamp down on both India and Pakistan, treating both the victim and the culprit alike.
It is surprising that while counselling restraint and patience to India, no US or international leader thought it prudent or necessary to ask Pakistan to shut its six-month long nuclear claptrap. Pakistan's nuclear behaviour makes a case study for dangerous and inconsistent nuclear posturing, which was corrected by General Musharraf after the Almaty conference. Even then, his predecessor, General Jahangir Karamat, now his roving Ambassador, was preaching nuclear first-use in European capitals.
India has played its cards shrewdly and, like in Kargil, let the US steal some of its thunder. Almost the entire world community has rallied round to India's case against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Hardly any voice even in the Islamic world has been raised against it. No wonder General Musharraf visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE earlier this month, the only two regimes along with Pakistan to have recognised the rogue Taliban regime.
These are very early stages of coercive diplomacy paying back. The first phase of this layered strategy ended with General Musharraf's January 12 speech in which he yielded on infiltration, banned the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and froze their accounts as demanded by India. This was certainly a minor victory.
The follow-up was less than satisfactory. Inadequate US pressure led to the General reversing these decisions. Preoccupied by its own war against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and needing the General's help in this, the US strayed off. So what seemed the US's dragging its feet on Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) had its inherent contradictions and compulsions. The General was being served both the carrot and stick. But this allowed infiltration to pick up in the months of April and May. So did the level of violence and India's impatience. Then on May 14 came Kaluchak, the massacre of civilians and the families, including children, of Armymen. Quite unexpectedly, Kaluchak became the symbol of national anguish. The country cried for revenge. Once more, like after the attack on Parliament, people demanded action.
Thus began Phase II of coercive diplomacy. Additional military pressure was exerted along the LoC, with aggressive artillery fire assaults on an unprecedented scale. On May 24, the Army was once more placed on full alert as immense diplomatic pressure built up against General Musharraf. Once again, the West asked Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism and honour his pledge of January 12. A defiant General spoke on May 27, renewing his commitment to end terrorism. As India would not let him repeat the charade of January 12, the US had to step in and secure from Pakistan the assurance that infiltration was ended, this time permanently. The Musharraf commitment came in the face of intense international pressure but also with the need for Indian reciprocity to ease the tension. Diplomacy came a full circle from January 12 to its renewal on May 27.
On the ground infiltration has begun to slow down since May 23. Between then and the time of writing this, only one attempt at infiltration has been foiled in the Rajouri sector. As is known, for every infiltration bid detected, two go unnoticed and unintercepted. One other attempt in the Drass sector reported by R&AW has not been confirmed by the Army. So in substance, only one infiltration against the normal four or five in a 27-day period is a reasonable indicator of the signs of the times. The next crucial step is laying on the ground and in the air a monitoring mechanism to verify the permanent stoppage of infiltration.
The Prime Minister's interview to a Hindi daily-in which he said that while the forces could not be pulled back, there could be some talks at the Army level-is significant. If Pakistan does agree, however reluctantly, to the idea of joint patrolling, there could be a window of opportunity there.
With infiltration stopped or nearly stopped, its infrastructure dismantled and a verification mechanism soon put in place, cross-border terrorism should deem to have ceased. But not quite. A Kaluchak could happen, engineered by the 2,000 or so terrorists-more than half foreigners-residing in J&K. To that end, India will need to put in place its internal diplomacy.
